

Function-Coherent Gambles

Gregory Wheeler



Plan

1

Ergodicity
Breaking


2

Varieties of
Discounting


3

Function
Coherence

Pólya's Urn



Pólya's Urn



- Proportion of red balls converges to *some* value between 0 and 1
- This limiting value is random
- Any value between 0 and 1 is **equally likely** as a limiting proportion

Pólya's Urn

$$\mathbb{E}[f] = \frac{1}{2} \neq \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu[f, t], \text{ for any sequence}$$

The ensemble average ($\frac{1}{2}$) is not representative of any individual trajectory.

No individual urn represents the "typical" behavior


Discounting Repeated Gambles

A SIMPLE GAMBLE f

Heads: **increase** your stake x by 50%

Tails: **decrease** your stake x by 40%

Discounting Repeated Gambles



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
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$$f(\omega, t) = \begin{cases} f(\omega_H, t) = x(t-1) + 0.5x(t-1) \\ f(\omega_T, t) = x(t-1) - 0.4x(t-1) \end{cases}$$

If $p = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\mathbf{x} = 1$ at t_0 , then $\mathbb{E}_p[f] = \mathbf{1.05}$

Should you stake €1 on 30 tosses?

Discounting Repeated Gambles



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
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
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
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
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
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
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Should you stake €1 on 30 tosses?

$\mathbb{E}_p[f] \approx \text{€}4.12$, after 30 tosses
expectation value

$\mathbb{E}_t[f] \approx \text{€}0.22$, after 30 tosses
most probable value

Discounting Repeated Gambles




UPSHOT

Expectation values **do not always reflect** what happens over time:

time average growth \neq expected rate of change

Discounting Repeated Gambles



BIRKHOF'S EQUALITY

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu[f(\omega, t)] = \mathbb{E}[f(\omega)]$$

Describes the conditions under which the expectation value of a repeated gamble is equivalent to *long-term time average* of a single sequence of gambles.

The **dogma of ergodicity** does not question whether this equality holds.

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Breaking
Dynamics

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Rationality Wars

It seems impossible to reach any definitive conclusions concerning human rationality in the absence of a detailed analysis of the sensitivity of the criterion and the cost involved in evaluating the alternatives. When the difficulty (or the costs) of the evaluations and the consistency (or the error) of the judgments are taken into account, a [transitivity-violating method] may prove superior.

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(Tversky 1969)

Preference Reversals in the Wild



Canadian Jay

Option A: 1 raisin (28cm distance)

Option B: 2 raisins (42cm distance)

Option C: 3 raisins (56cm distance)

$A \succ B \succ C$

yet

$C \succ A$

(Waite 2001)

Preference Reversals in the Wild



Honeybees

Option A

Option B

Option C


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(Shafir 1994)

Preference Reversals in the Wild



Slime Mold

Option A

Option B

Option C

$$A \succ B \succ C$$

yet

$$C \succ A$$

(Latty & Beekman 2011)

Preference Reversals in the Wild



Humans

Exponential Discounting

$$present_value \times e^{-rt}$$

- Discount rate constant over time
- Never produces preference reversals

Hyperbolic Discounting

$$present_value / (1 + kt)$$

- Discount rate decreases as time-delay increases
- Regularly produces preference reversals

Preference Reversals in the Wild



Humans

Hyperbolic Discounting

Scenario 1: Choose

- ✓ **A)** \$100 today
- B)** \$110 tomorrow

Scenario 2: Choose

- A)** \$100 in 30 days
- ✓ **B)** \$110 in 31 days

Preference Reversals in the Wild



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*Average Americans live ~4 years longer with hyperbolic discounting
compared to exponential discounting*

(Strulik & Schünemann 2018)

Varieties of Discounting

Hyperbolic $D_H(t) = \frac{1}{1 + kt}, \quad k > 0$

Quasi-Hyperbolic $D_Q(t) = \{ 1 \text{ if } t = 0, \beta\delta^t \text{ if } t > 0 \}$

Generalized Hyperbolic $D_G(t) = \frac{1}{(1 + kt)^p}, \quad k > 0, p > 0$

Scale-Dependent $D_S(t, x) = D(t)^{\eta(x)}$

State-Dependent $D_W(t, x) = e^{-r(s)t}$

Hybrid $D_{hyb}(t) = \lambda D_1(t) + (1 - \lambda)D_2(t), \quad \lambda \in [0, 1]$

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Desirable Gambles

\mathbb{D} is a **coherent set of desirable gambles** (Williams 1975; Walley 2000) iff:

- A1. If $f < 0$, then $f \notin \mathbb{D}$ (Avoid partial losses)
- A2. If $f \geq 0$, then $f \in \mathbb{D}$ (Accept partial gains)
- A3. If $f \in \mathbb{D}$, then $\lambda f \in \mathbb{D}$ ($\lambda \geq 0$) (Positive scale invariance)
- A4. If $f \in \mathbb{D}$ and $g \in \mathbb{D}$, then $f + g \in \mathbb{D}$ (Combination)

f, g are bounded gambles, assessed pointwise; $\lambda \geq 0$

Thm: If \mathbb{D} is coherent, then there is a $\underline{\mathbb{E}}(f)$ ($\forall f \in \mathbb{D}$)

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$$\mathbb{E}(\lambda f) = \lambda \mathbb{E}(f) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}(f + g) = \mathbb{E}(f) + \mathbb{E}(g)$$

$$\underline{\mathbb{E}}(\lambda f) = \lambda \underline{\mathbb{E}}(f) \quad \text{and} \quad \underline{\mathbb{E}}(f + g) \geq \underline{\mathbb{E}}(f) + \underline{\mathbb{E}}(g)$$

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IDEA

Desire satisfaction is concave.

But 'desirability' is linear:

- scale invariance
- additive

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
- **scale invariance**
- **additive**

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
Bernoulli (1738) utility of wealth

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Classical Coherence

Linear Operations
on Gambles




Representation by
Linear Functional



$$\underline{\mathbb{E}}(f)$$

- ✓ *No sure loss*
- ✓ *Monotonicity*
- ✓ *Cardinal utility*

U Coherence



Function-Coherent Gambles

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$$h = u^{-1}(\lambda u(f) + \mu u(g))$$

is **defined**, $h \in \mathbb{D}$. (u -Convexity)

Function-Coherent Gambles

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- F3a.** $u : X \mapsto V$ is a strictly increasing and continuous bijection onto its image, $u(X) \subseteq V$.
- F3b.** The image $u(X)$ is convex. Specifically, for any $f, g \in \mathbb{D}$ and any non-negative scalars λ, μ , the linear combination $\lambda u(f) + \mu u(g)$ is always in the domain of u^{-1}

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PROPERTIES

- **Non-triviality:**
 - \mathbb{D} is non-empty
 - Every f with $u(f) \geq 0$ is acceptable
- **Upward Closure:** If $f \in \mathbb{D}$ and $g \in X$ satisfies $g(s) \geq f(s)$ for all states s , then $g \in \mathbb{D}$.
- **Transform Convexity:** The u -transformed set

$$U(\mathbb{D}) := \{u(f) : f \in \mathbb{D}\}$$

is a convex cone.

- **Transform Invariance:** For strictly increasing ϕ with $\phi(0) = 0$, if $\tilde{u} = \phi \circ u$ then
$$\{f \in X : \tilde{u}(f) \geq 0\} = \{f \in X : u(f) \geq 0\} = \mathbb{D}.$$

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- **Regularity Assumptions:**
 - \mathbb{D} is non-empty
 - \mathbb{D} possesses a non-empty interior

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THM 1 (REPRESENTATION)

There exists a continuous linear functional $\ell : V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, unique up to positive scaling, such that

$$f \in \mathbb{D} \iff \ell(u(f)) \geq 0.$$

THM 2 (CLOSURE UNDER LIMITS)

Suppose X is a topological vector space and the utility function $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous.

An acceptance set is $\mathbb{D} = \{f \in X : u(f) \geq 0\}$. If $\{f_n\}$ is a sequence in \mathbb{D} that converges to some $f \in X$, then $f \in \mathbb{D}$.

Representation and Risk Measures

THREE IMPLICATIONS

$$f \in \mathbb{D} \Leftrightarrow \ell(u(f)) \geq 0$$

- ρ is a **generalized risk measure** incorporating non-linear utility
- **Preference-belief Decomposition:** The composition $\ell \circ u$ cleanly separates:
 - Preferences* encoded by utility u , and
 - Beliefs* captured by aggregator ℓ .
- **Order invariance:** relative preferences, not absolute risk values, determine choice behavior.

Function-coherent gambles

Gregory Wheeler¹

¹Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Germany

ABSTRACT

The desirable gambles framework provides a foundational approach to imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility assumptions. This paper introduces *function-coherent gambles*, a gen-

classification-theoretic formulations of non-linear desirability, the approach in [25] and here maintains an axiomatic foundations and connects non-linear utility to representation via continuous functionals. In [25], two routes were initially explored. The first preserves the additive structure of the desirable gambles framework

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FUNCTION-COHERENCE


\mathbb{D} is **function-coherent** iff:

- F1. If $f < 0$, then $f \notin \mathbb{D}$ (Avoid partial losses)
- F2. If $f \geq g$ and $g \in \mathbb{D}$, then $f \in \mathbb{D}$ (Monotonicity)
- F3. For $f, g \in \mathbb{D}$ and nonnegative λ, μ where

$$h = u^{-1}(\lambda u(f) + \mu u(g))$$

is **defined**, $h \in \mathbb{D}$. (u -Convexity)

Function-Coherent Gamble Dynamics



Updates wealth by a factor of $1 + f(\omega)$ in state ω .
After n independent repetitions, wealth evolves as

$$w' = w \prod_{i=1}^n (1 + f(\omega_i)).$$

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Function-Coherent Gamble Dynamics

NON-ADDITIVE SEQUENCE DYNAMICS

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The long-run performance is determined by the **geometric mean**, or equivalently, by the time-average of logarithmic returns:

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log(1 + f(\omega_i)).$$

Idea: Introduce a non-linear combination operator.

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Function-Coherent Gamble Dynamics

NON-LINEAR COMBINATION

(F4) **Nonlinear Combination:** If $f \in \mathbb{D}$ and $g \in \mathbb{D}$, then their nonlinear combination

$$\begin{aligned} f(\omega) \oplus g(\omega) &:= \phi^{-1}\left(\phi(f(\omega)) + \phi(g(\omega))\right) \\ &= (1 + f(\omega))(1 + g(\omega)) - 1, \end{aligned}$$

is also in \mathbb{D} .

LOG-RETURN TRANSFORMATION

Define

$$L(f) := \log(1 + f)$$

Then,

$$L(f \oplus g) = L(f) + L(g)$$

Function-Coherent Gamble Dynamics

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Key idea: The \oplus operator converts multiplicative effects into an additive structure in the log-domain.

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Function-Coherent Gambles

FUNCTION-COHERENCE

$\mathbb{D} \subseteq X$ is **function-coherent** iff:

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THM 3 (LOG-DOMAIN ADDITIVITY)

Let f and g be gambles satisfying $f(\omega), g(\omega) > -1$ for all ω . Then, for every state $\omega \in \Omega$,

$$\log(1 + (f \oplus g)(\omega)) = \log(1 + f(\omega)) + \log(1 + g(\omega)).$$

THM 4 (FUNCTION-COHERENCE PRESERV'TN)

Let X be a space of gambles on Ω with $f(\omega) > -1$ for all $f \in X$ and $\omega \in \Omega$. Suppose the acceptance set $\mathbb{D} \subseteq X$ satisfies (F1 to F3), the regularity conditions, and (F4).

Then there exists a continuous linear functional η on a suitable vector space V (of log-returns) such that for every gamble $f \in X$,

$$f \in \mathbb{D} \iff \ell(L(f)) \geq 0.$$

Some well-behaved utility functions

Several important classes of well-behaved utility functions emerge:

1. **Power Utilities:** For $\gamma \neq 0$,

$$u_{\gamma}(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{x^{\gamma}}{\gamma}, & x \geq 0 \\ -\infty, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$

Leading to the combination operator:

$$f \oplus_{u_{\gamma}} g = (f^{\gamma} + g^{\gamma})^{1/\gamma}$$

2. **Exponential Utilities:** For $\alpha > 0$, as studied by (Arrow 1965):

$$u_{\alpha}(x) = 1 - e^{-\alpha x}$$

With combination operator:

$$f \oplus_{u_{\alpha}} g = -\frac{1}{\alpha} \log \left(e^{-\alpha f} + e^{-\alpha g} - 1 \right)$$

Some well-behaved utility functions

3. *Logarithmic Utility*: Our previous case from (Wheeler 2021):

$$u(x) = \log(1 + x)$$

With combination operator:

$$f \oplus g = (1 + f)(1 + g) - 1$$

Risk Measurement and Dynamic Properties

Definition (Induced Risk Measure)

For a utility function u with well-behaved combination operator \oplus_u , the induced risk measure is:

$$\rho_u(f) := -\ell(u(f))$$

where ℓ is the linear functional.

Risk Measurement and Dynamic Properties

1. **Power Utility Risk Measures** ($\gamma \in (0, 1)$):

$$\rho_{\gamma}(f) = -\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{f^{\gamma}}{\gamma} \right]$$

exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion. Under power utility, an agent's risk aversion decreases as wealth increases (Merton 1971; Acerbi 2002).

2. Exponential Risk Measures:

$$\rho_{\alpha}(f) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log \mathbb{E}[e^{-\alpha f}]$$

exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, recovering the entropic risk measure. Under exponential risk utility, an agent's risk aversion is absolute regardless of wealth (Föllmer and Schied 2002).

3. Logarithmic Risk Measures:

$$\rho_{\log}(f) = -\mathbb{E}[\log(1 + f)]$$

exhibits constant relative risk aversion and naturally captures multiplicative risks.

Like power utility, logarithmic risk aversion is proportional. Unlike power utility, logarithmic risk captures proportional multiplicative risk (i.e., compounding), which is a property of gambles rather than a psychological appetite for risk (Kelly 1956; Peters 2019; Wheeler 2018).

Function-coherent gambles with non-additive sequential dynamics

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ABSTRACT

The desirable gambles framework provides a rigorous foundation for imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility via its coherence axioms. In our related work, we introduced function-coherent gambles to accommodate non-linear utility. However, when repeated gambles are played over time—especially in intertemporal choice where rewards compound multiplicatively—the standard additive combination axiom fails to capture the appropriate long-run evaluation. In this paper we extend the framework by relaxing the ad-

essential rationality conditions [27]. A recent generalization replaces the standard convexity closure with a more abstract closure operator to model non-linearity directly in the acceptance set [15]. In contrast, the present paper develops a concrete and operationally motivated specialization of this approach. We introduce a novel combination operator that preserves coherence while accommodating non-linear utility, addressing a fundamental limitation in the standard desirable gambles framework. This operator, defined as $f \oplus g = (1 + f)(1 + g) - 1$, naturally captures the multiplicative dynamics of compound growth while maintaining essential rationality

Plan

1

Ergodicity
Breaking

Dynamics

2

Varieties of
Discounting

Preference
Change

3

Function
Coherence

Belief / Utility
&
Dynamics

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