

# Confidence in belief, weight of evidence and uncertainty reporting

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## Introduction

### Keynes / Ellsberg Example

**Unknown urn:** 100 balls, each red or black (no more information).

**Known urn:** 100 balls, 50 red, 50 black.

**Keynes** Your beliefs about the colour of the next ball drawn?

- **Balance of evidence:** same
- **Weight of evidence:** different
- Bayesian belief: same ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ).

**Ellsberg** Which urn would you rather bet on?

- Most people: Known urn
- Bayesian decision: indifferent.

These preferences can be justified by:

- a higher **weight of evidence** in the case of the known urn
- higher **confidence in one's belief / credal judgement** of  $\frac{1}{2}$  for red on the next draw from the known urn

Bayesianism denies **weight of evidence** and **confidence in beliefs** any role in choice.

**But Uncertainty reporting** in the form of:

- Beliefs / credal judgements / probability assessments
- Confidence in them

is used by the **IPCC, US Defense Intelligence Agency**.

## Objectives

1. A model of **confidence in belief / weight of evidence**
2. A framework for **effective uncertainty reporting**

**Desiderata for 2.** (in theory):

- a. **Clean belief / value separation**
- b. **Uncertainty language supporting unambiguous inter-agent communication**

### A. The larger project

Develop an account of confidence in beliefs that:

- ✓ Includes a model of (confidence in) beliefs
- ✓ Brings out its role in (rational) decision making
- ✓ Defends its normative credentials
- ✓ Sheds lights on its role in communicating severe uncertainty (e.g. IPCC)
- ✓ Incorporates a theory of belief updating
  - and techniques for confidence elicitation ...

## 1. Model




Figure 1: Confidence Ranking

**Confidence Ranking:** nested family of sets of probability measures (i.e. of subsets of  $\Delta(S)$ ). [2]

- Each set: confidence level
- Larger sets: higher confidence
- Credal statements (e.g.  $p(R) \geq 0.3$ ) holding everywhere in a set: those judgements held at that level of confidence.

**This model:**

- Confidence / weight of evidence **admits of degrees**
- It is **ordinal**
- Confidence rankings **portray** the precision / weight trade-off
- ... **without asking the agent to settle it.**

### 2.a. Belief / Value Separation

#### Under IP

**No clean separation** between beliefs and uncertainty attitude (see comparative statics results [3]):

- In the context of decision, sets of probability measures can reflect **both** beliefs and uncertainty tolerance / prudence.

**Elicitation of probability intervals:**

- reporting one interval requires trading off its accuracy against its informativeness
- ... and that needs value judgements.

#### Under Confidence Approach

**Clean separation** (see [4, 5]) between:

- **beliefs and confidence in beliefs** represented by the confidence ranking
- **attitudes to uncertainty / limited confidence** represented by the cautiousness coefficient (see box B).

**Accuracy / informativeness trade-off:**

- portrayed by the confidence ranking
- made, for a given decision, by the cautiousness coefficient.

### 2.b. Uncertainty Language

**Challenge:** to **calibrate** confidence levels across agents.

#### Calibrating Probability

How are rational agents' probability assessments calibrated?

- On "objectively uncertain / chance" events.

- $E_{0.25}$ : red ball drawn from urn with 5 red / 15 blue balls.
- $E_{0.2}$ : red ball drawn from urn with 4 red / 16 blue balls.

$E_{0.25}$  has an "objectively higher chance" than  $E_{0.2}$ .

**Principal Principle** If the only available information is that  $E_x$  has a higher chance than  $E_y$ , then a rational agent considers  $E_x$  to be subjectively more likely than  $E_y$ . [6]

⇒ Events  $E_x$  **calibrate probability levels** across (rational) agents.  
(I.e. They support an inter-agent comparable assignment of subjective probability / degree-of-belief numbers.)

#### Calibrating Confidence

**Idea** Use "objective" weight-of-evidence comparisons.

- $E_n$ : next ball drawn from urn is red, where:
  - Urn contains 20 balls (red or blue)
  - $2n$  draws observed,  $n$  of which are red
- $P_n$ : judgement that the probability of  $E_n \geq 0.4$

Weight of evidence for  $P_{50}$  is "objectively" higher than for  $P_5$

**Weight-of-Evidence Principal Principle** If the only information available supports  $P_m$  objectively with more weight of evidence than  $P_n$ , then a rational agent holds  $P_m$  with more confidence than  $P_n$ .

⇒ Probability judgements  $P_n$  **calibrate confidence levels** across (rational) agents.

## B. Confidence and decision




Figure 2: Confidence & Decision Making

**Cautiousness coefficient**  $D$ : function assigning a set in the confidence ranking to each decision [4, 5].

- Family of decision rules, each using the set identified by  $D$ .
- E.g. evaluate an act  $f$  according to  $\inf_{p \in D(f)} EU_p f$  [4]

Characteristics of the family [2]:

- Faithful to the pre-formal **maxim**:  
*the higher the stakes involved in the decision, the more confidence is required in a belief for it to play a role.*
- **Normatively reasonable implications for choice**
  - Point of divergence from IP: weakens Stakes Independence (betting quotients are independent of the stakes).

## Information / Details

**Confidence Elicitation Web tool:**

- <http://confidence.hec.fr/app/>.

**Papers, slides, talks:**

- <http://www.hec.fr/hill>
- <http://www.desevun.org>

**Contact:**

- [hill@hec.fr](mailto:hill@hec.fr)

## References

- [1] Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson, and Brian Hill. Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision. *Philosophy of Science*, 84(3):500–522, 2017.
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- [3] Ithzak Gilboa and Massimo Marinacci. Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm. In *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society*. 2013.
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